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Abstract—This article describes the use of a near-field electro-
magnetic pulse EMP injection technique in order to perform a
hardware cryptanalysis of the AES algorithm. This characteriza-
tion technique is based on the fact that conductors, such as the
rails of a Power Distribution Network PDN which is one of the
primary EMI risk factors, act as antennas for the radiated EMP
energy. This energy induces high electrical currents in the PDN
responsible for the violation of the integrated circuit’s timing
constraints. This modification of the chip’s behavior is then
exploited in order to recover the AES key by using cryptanalysis
techniques based on Differential Fault Analysis (DFA).
I. INTRODUCTION
Electromagnetic interferences (EMI) are unwanted distur-
bances that affect integrated circuits due to electromagnetic
conduction or electromagnetic radiation emitted from an in-
ternal or external source. From an EM Compatibility (EMC)
point-of-view, EMI whether intentional or not, are considered
as a source of noise and interferences. Today, electromagnetic
susceptibility of integrated circuits represent also vulnerabili-
ties for hardware security modules like smart-cards. Recently,
from a security point of view, researchers, industrials and
governmental agencies are focusing with strong interest on
these electromagnetic disturbances.
The efficiency of the EM channel is mainly due to the inner
properties of EM emissions. Their ability to propagate through
different materials is the most interesting one since it allows an
attacker to bypass the chip package and/or some EM shields
implemented as counter-measure. Moreover, the small size of
EM probes permits to focus the perturbation into a small area
of the targeted device. This is all the more interesting since it
also allows getting around global hardware countermeasures
against power glitches such as the use of detached power
supplies [1] by focusing the EMP injection on reduced die
areas.
Two kinds of near-field EM perturbations are usually consid-
ered: transient pulses and harmonic emissions. In [2] authors
considered the effect of a 1 GHz electric field applied to an IC
with an embedded ring oscillator (RO). The main component
of that electric field was the transverse one (i.e. parallel to
the surface of the chip). The perturbation impacted the output
frequency of the RO. Monitoring the effect of that perturbation
enabled them to draw a cartography of the sensitive areas
of the chip. A cross examination between the layout of the
device and the cartography demonstrates that the coupling
between the injection antenna and the circuit lies mainly in the
Power Distribution Network (PDN). Regarding transient EM
pulses, Schmidt et al. reported the use of a spark generator
to fault a CRT-based RSA algorithm running on an 8-bits
micro-controller [3]. The injected fault leads to a successful
attack as it allows them to factorize the RSA modulus. Besides,
their experimental setups is characterized by a very large jitter
because of the use of the spark-generator.
This article describes the use of the EM channel to carry
out attacks against a hardware AES embedded in a FPGA with
a good temporal and spacial resolution. Transient electromag-
netic pulses (EMPs) are injected with a very low jitter on top of
the surface of the targets using a 500 µm-diameter magnetic
antenna. By doing so, we intend to analyze firstly, the effect of
the EMP’s polarity on the target, secondly, whether the effect
of the EMP on the target is global or local, and finally, the
occurrence and the behavior of the faults induced by a very
short EM pulse.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. We
describe the EMP injection bench used to generate EMPs in
section II. In sections III we study the effect of a localized
EMP injected on top of the surface of an FPGA while executing
the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES). As a conclusion,
section IV summarizes our findings.
II. TEST SETUP
In this section, the near-field EMP pulse injection bench used
to induce transient faults is described.
Fig. 1. Near-field EMP injection bench.
Fig. 2. The FPGA package footprint [4]
A. Pulsed EMI bench description
The near-field EMP injection bench (Figure 1) is built of
a control PC, the device under test (Target), a motorized
stage, a pulse generator, and a 500 µm-diameter magnetic
antenna. The antenna is moved above the target by means
of a high-precision mechanical positioning system (to within
0.01µm minimum). Every element of the bench is controlled
by the control PC, and the communication with the target is
established through a serial port or a smart card reader.
The pulse generator is capable of generating 200 V with
high current (4 A) directed to a target by the antenna 50 Ω
loads (with a very low jitter < 30ps), and at repetition rates
up to 50 kHz. The output pulse width is variable from 10 to
200 ns. The rise and fall times are 2 ns or less, 20%− 80%.
B. Test chip description
The device under test is a FPGA (Xilinx Spartan 3 family
Fig. 2). Internal core logic circuits such as the configurable
logic blocks CLB and programmable interconnect operate from
the 1.2V VCCINT voltage supply inputs. All VCCINT inputs
are connected together and to the +1.2V voltage supply, but in
order to guarantee problem-free operation, a supply decoupling
is present, as described in [4].
This FPGA implements a hardware 128 bits version of the
AES algorithm [5]. This algorithm is used for various security
purposes. The design is written in VHDL and synthesized for
the FPGA. It is built out of three main blocks: a communication
and control module (FSM), a key expansion module and a
cipher module (ROUND EXE). A manual Place-and-Route stage
is performed in order to distinguish between the impacted
logical blocks by a comparison with the Floorplan (Figure
3).
We choose to use a 128 bit-wide data path AES and to
execute simultaneously on the chip the key expansion and
cipher routines. As a consequence, a complete encryption
round takes only one clock period, and the whole encryption
process is executed in eleven clock periods.
The key expansion routine generates the round keys ”on-the-
fly”. For each clock cycle, a new round key is obtained from
Fig. 3. Floorplan of the device under test
the key expansion module and sent to the cipher module. The
cipher module’s architecture is divided into five submodules:
ADDROUNDKEY, SUBBYTES, SHIFTROWS, MIXCOLUMNS,
and Mux. The first four, as their names suggest, correspond
to the individual AES transformations. The ADDROUNDKEY
module owns a dedicated output to store the ciphertext after
the final round. The MIXCOLUMNS module is bypassed during
the final round.
III. INJECTING DELAY USING PULSED EMI
This section first reviews the principles of digital circuits
synchronous operation in order to introduce DFA. From this,
a susceptibility criterion is defined in order to perform a near
field EMP injection cartography.
A. Timing design considerations
In this subsection we review shortly the principle of the
synchronous behavior of digital ICs. In broad outline, syn-
chronous digital circuits execute digital calculation synchro-
nized by a common clock. They could be described as blocks
of combinatorial logic separated with register banks of D
flip-flop sharing the same clock as figure 4 shows. The data
are generally latched by the registers on the positive edge of
the clock. Between two successive clock positive edges, the
computed data have to travel from one register to the next. The
time needed by the data to propagate through combinatorial
logic is called the propagation delay. This delay and an other
Fig. 4. Synchronous Representation of Digital ICs
Fig. 5. Faults cartography for a Positive EMP
delay inherent to the use of D flip-flop, called the setup time,
affect the choice of the nominal circuit period. Indeed, to
ensure a correct computation of the circuit, the clock period
must be chosen strictly greater than the critical delay path plus
the setup time of the registers, where the critical delay path
is the biggest combinatorial logic propagation delay between
two registers found in the considered circuit. Equation 1 sums
up this constraint:
Tclock > tcritical + tsetup (1)
Each data bit at the input of a register possesses its own logical
cones from the previous register bank associated with its own
propagation time. Furthermore, this propagation time is not
a constant; it depends highly on the data handled across the
logic and the circuit’s power supply voltage.
A transient glitch in the power supply voltage, induced by
an EMP, will modify the integrated circuit timings. As the
master clock frequency remains the same, faults occur in the
circuit. These faults may be exploited by an attacker to break
a cipher like the AES [6], [7], [8]. The attack of Piret et al. [7]
is one of the most powerful. It allows to retrieve an AES key
with only one pair of correct/faulty ciphertexts when a fault
is induced on a single byte of the state before the penultimate
MixColumn.
B. Near field susceptibility cartography
In this test, the susceptibility criterion is a timing violation
of the AES design constraints. A high susceptibility value
refers to a large number of violated paths, while a low
susceptibility value refers to an execution without any timing
violation. The pulse width value is chosen to match the clock
period (TCLK = 10ns), with an amplitude of 100 Volts.
A susceptibility cartography of the design is performed
during the last round of the AES. It aims at disclosing the
(X,Y) coordinates where the EMP induces a timing violation
(i.e faulty computation). The whole surface of the package is
exposed to a localized EMP with a displacement step of 500µm
(which is also the antenna diameter). The relative distance
between the antenna and the surface of the package is set to
500µm. At each location, an EMP is injected during the last
round of the AES and the corresponding faulted ciphertext (if
Fig. 6. Faults cartography for a Negative EMP
any) is retrieved. This process is done for 1,000 encryptions of
the same plaintext input, and for every of the 30x30 different
locations of the injection antenna on top of the FPGA package.
1) Positive EMP: In this test, and according to the polarity
of the EMP, only a coupling between the antenna and the
ground network of the circuit will vary the susceptibility crite-
rion. Figure 5 reports the resulting susceptibility cartography
for a positive EMP with an amplitude of +100 Volts. In this
figure, the red square in the center corresponds to the FPGA
die position. At each location, the number of faulted bits are
reported.
Considering Figure 5, we observe that the targeted chip is
very sensitive to the positive EMP. In fact, a large number of
locations over the surface of the package seems more sensitive
to a positive EMP than a negative one. This high susceptibility
is due to a low resistivity of the ground network in comparison
with a decoupled power network.
2) Negative EMP: Figure 6 reports the resulting susceptibil-
ity cartography for a negative EMP with an amplitude of -100
Volts. In this figure, the red square in the center corresponds
to the FPGA die position. At each location, the number of most
frequent faulted bits are reported.
Considering Figure 6, we observe that the effect of the EMP
is clearly localized in space. Some locations above the surface
of the circuit are more sensitive to the EMP than others. When
the EMP is localized in the region near the block cipher, the
number of faulted data paths increases. Moreover, we observe
a good correlation between the most sensitive coordinates and
the position of the ROUNDEXE in Figure 3. This logical block
is the place where the critical delay path is located.
Figure 7 shows the behavior of the induced faults for a
first random position (X1,Y1,Z) on top of the die’s surface
(7X7mm2) right in the ROUNDEXE area (the cipher module).
1,000 encryptions were done with random plaintexts and a
constant key while injecting EMPs during the last round of the
AES calculations. The occurrence rates of both single-bit (i.e.
fault affecting a single bit) and multi-bits faults are given.
The path corresponding to the 15th byte appears to be the
most sensitive to the EMP at coordinates (X1 ,Y1,Z). For this



















Fig. 7. Fault occurrence at coordinates (X1,Y1,Z)
byte, 3% of the faults were single-bit, and 80% of the faults
were multi-bits faults. It also reveals a data-dependence of
the injected faults to the data handled by the target. This
behavior was corroborated by an inspection of the faults.
In fact different faults values (’0’ or ’1’) were obtained for
different plaintexts with the same experimental settings. This
behavior is as well a feature of faults induced by timing
constraints violation (its origin lies in the data-dependence of
the data propagation time through combinatorial logic). This
is another sign that reinforces the assumption that the fault
injection mechanism by means of EMP is related to timing
constraints violation.
The same experiment was carried out for two other locations
(X2 ,Y2,Z) and (X3 ,Y3,Z) on top of the die with the same
1,000 plaintexts used previously. Figures 8 and 9 report the
corresponding single-bit and multi-bits fault occurrence rates.
These three figures (7, 8 and 9) exhibit different occurrence
rates: the injection antenna location has an effect on the
induced faults and on their related properties. In fact, at
coordinates (X1,Y1,Z), the 15
th byte is the most sensitive to
the EMP. Whereas, at coordinates (X2 ,Y2,Z) and (X3 ,Y3,Z)
the most sensitive paths correspond to the 11th byte and to
the 7th byte respectively. We observed that the faulted paths
were different for different locations of the injection antenna.
The evidence of a local effect (i.e. restricted to a part of
the device’s area) of the EMPs, demonstrates the ability to
fault sub-critical paths. In some locations, the most critical
one is never faulted. This is a very interesting property (for
an attacker) since it is possible to select the disturbed path
without always affecting the most critical ones as it is the
case for direct power injection techniques.
IV. CONCLUSION
The reported fault injection experiment reveals the ability
to inject single-bit and multi-bits faults into the calculations of
the AES. These faults were found data dependent. Moreover, a
local effect of EMPs was underlined: the injected faults (if any)
are modified when the injection antenna location is changed.
According to the experiments, EMP injection mechanism may
lie in a coupling between the EMP and the internal PDN of the



















Fig. 8. Fault occurrence at coordinates (X2,Y2,Z)



















Fig. 9. Fault occurrence at coordinates (X3,Y3,Z)
targeted chip. This coupling induces a transient decrease of the
voltage applied to the logic of the target. As a consequence, the
propagation delays through the logic are increased until faults
are induced by the violation of the chip’s timing constraints.
This property of EMP fault injection is particularly worrying.
Indeed, it may allow to bypass many countermeasures intended
to prevent direct power injection (e.g. power supply low-pass
filtering, use of internal supply monitoring, etc.).
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